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Abstract
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and shar-
ing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard
and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of
greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding
and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending
when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and
poor financial integration, strict regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase
monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning
the use of multiple-bank lending in small business lending.
JEL classification: D82; G21; G32
Keywords: individual-bank lending, multiple-bank lending, monitoring, diversifica-
tion, free-riding problem
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There seems to be a wide consensus among economists on the role that banks
perform in the economy. The theoretical literature portrays banks as reducing in-
formation asymmetries between investors and borrowers. In originating loans and
monitoring borrowers, banks acquire private information about loans and enhance
the value of investment projects (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Boot and Thakor, 2000). The
empirical literature supports this view, and it suggests improved project payoffs as
the special feature of bank lending relative to capital market lending (e.g., James,
1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989, Hoshi et al., 1990; and the review in Ongena
and Smith, 2000a). Further, evidence indicates that the monitoring role of banks is
mostly important in small business lending because, due to the information opacity
of small firms, granting loans requires continuous interaction and qualitative criteria
to process soft information (e.g., Slovin et al., 1992; Cole et al., 2004).
The “classical” theory of banks as delegated monitors originating from Diamond
(1984) argues that exclusive bank-firm relationships are optimal as they avoid du-
plication of monitoring efforts as well as free-riding. This argument seems, however,
at odds with some stylized facts and empirical findings on the number of bank re-
lationships. In several countries even relatively small firms borrow from more than
one bank at the same time. The distribution of the number of bank relationships per
firm varies substantially across countries, but single-bank lending tends to be rare
and multiple-bank lending often consists of many banks. For example, Ongena and
Smith (2000b) find that less than 15% of the firms in their sample from 20 European
countries maintain a single relationship, and 20% of the firms use eight or more banks.
Detragiache et al. (2000) report that 89% of small Italian firms borrow from multiple
banks with a median number of five relationships; and that small US firms have a
median number of two bank relationships.
These empirical observations raise a number of important questions. If monitor-
ing is one of the main functions −if not the main function− that banks exert, why
should they decide to share firms’ financing if this reduces their monitoring function?
Does the great use of multiple-bank lending suggest that the role of banks as dele-
gated monitors is of minor importance? Or does multiple-bank lending entail some
−previously unnoticed− benefits for banks’ incentives to monitor? These questions
are critical especially in contexts like small business lending, where monitoring seems
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to be essential, banks retain some bargaining power and can decide −at least to some
extent− the preferred lending structure. They are also timely as the ongoing process
of deregulation expands loan markets, and it confronts banks with the issues of how
to enter into new markets and monitor new clients.
The literature has explained the banks’ choice of multiple-bank lending in terms of
two inefficiencies affecting exclusive bank-firm relationships, namely the hold-up and
the soft-budget-constraint problems.1 According to the hold-up literature, sharing
lending avoids the expropriation of informational rents. This improves firms’ incen-
tives to make proper investment choices and in turn it increases banks’ profits (e.g.,
Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; and, in particular, Von Thadden, 1992 and 2004; Padilla
and Pagano, 1997). As for the soft-budget-constraint problem, multiple-bank lending
enables banks not to extend further inefficient credit, thus reducing firms’ strategic
defaults (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Both of
these theories consider multiple-bank lending as a way for banks to commit towards
entrepreneurs and improve their incentives. None of them, however, addresses how
multiple-bank lending affects banks’ incentives to monitor, and thus can explain the
apparent discrepancy between the widespread use of multiple-bank lending and the
importance of bank monitoring.
This paper tries to fill this gap by focusing on how the number of bank rela-
tionships affects banks’ incentives to monitor and their decision to share lending.
Our main insight is that, when one considers explicitly banks’ incentives to monitor,
multiple-bank lending may become an optimal way for banks with limited lending
capacities to commit to higher monitoring levels. Despite involving free-riding and
duplication of efforts, sharing lending allows banks to expand the number of loans and
achieve greater diversification. This mitigates the agency problem between banks and
depositors, and it improves banks’ monitoring incentives. Thus, differently from the
classical theory of banks as delegated monitors, the paper suggests that multiple-bank
lending may positively affect overall monitoring and increase firms’ future profitabil-
ity. The result provides a possible theoretical rationale for the finding in Houston and
James (1996) that firms borrowing from multiple banks −but not from other multiple
1Explanations of firms’ choice to borrow from multiple banks include the desire to reduce over-
monitoring problems and the liquidity risk affecting exclusive bank-firm relationships (Carletti, 2004;
Detragiache et al., 2000).
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private creditors− improve their growth opportunities; and in Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998) that close ties to a bank do not necessarily lead to higher profits or growth
rates of Japanese firms.
Building upon Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we address these issues in a one-
period model where monitoring plays an important economic role, and its level is
an endogenous function of the number of banks. There are three types of agents:
Firms, banks and investors. Firms need external funds to undertake investment
projects and can privately decide whether to exert effort and increase project success
probabilities. Banks can ameliorate this moral hazard problem through monitoring,
which is, however, costly and not observable. This unobservability introduces another
moral hazard problem between banks and depositors. Banks’ incentives to monitor
depend on whether they lend to firms individually or share lending with other banks.
Multiple-bank lending allows banks to finance more independent projects and reach
greater diversification; but it entails also free-riding and duplication of efforts. Greater
diversification improves banks’ monitoring incentives, as it reduces the variance of the
average return of their portfolios and it allows banks to be residual claimants of any
additional marginal benefit of monitoring. This lowers deposit rates and improves
monitoring incentives further. Banks choose to share lending whenever the benefit of
greater diversification in terms of higher per-project monitoring dominates the costs
of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The attractiveness of multiple-bank lending
decreases with the amount of banks’ inside equity and prior project profitability, and
it increases with the cost of monitoring.
Our model has a number of empirical implications for the determinants of multiple-
bank lending. First, concerning the level of inside equity, the model predicts a greater
use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to the projects they fi-
nance. Thus, to the extent that the degree of concentration of the banking system is
correlated with the relative sizes of banks and firms, the model implies a lower use of
multiple-bank lending in concentrated banking systems. Second, as the higher mon-
itoring achievable with multiple-bank lending has a greater impact on firms’ value
when investment projects are less profitable, our theory suggests a negative relation-
ship between firms’ prior profitability and number of bank relationships. Third, in
so far as these factors affect monitoring costs, multiple-bank lending should be neg-
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atively related to the level of financial integration, the efficiency of judicial systems,
and the quality of disclosure rules and accounting standards. These three predictions
find empirical support in Ongena and Smith (2000b) and Detragiache et al. (2000).
Moreover, the model has some indirect predictions concerning the use of multiple-
bank lending and other diversification opportunities. In particular, it suggests that
banks should be less inclined to share lending in the presence of well developed equity
markets and after a process of consolidation. Both outside equity and mergers and
acquisitions increase banks’ lending capacities, thus reducing their need of greater
diversification and monitoring through multiple-bank lending. Consistent with this,
Ongena and Smith (2000b) find a negative relationship between the strength of equity
markets and the use of multiple-bank lending; and Karceski et al. (2004) and Degryse
et al. (2004) document that, after they merge, banks are more likely to terminate
lending relationships with firms borrowing from multiple banks.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide in a static model a new expla-
nation of banks’ choice of multiple-bank lending which focuses on banks’ leveraged
liability structure and limited lending capacities. The incentive mechanism of di-
versification works only if banks raise deposits. Otherwise, greater diversification
decreases the variance of the average portfolio return, but it has no effects on banks’
monitoring incentives. In this case, multiple-bank lending is no longer optimal as
free-riding and duplication of efforts lead to lower monitoring. This result shows that
in our model the value of diversification does not amount to the reduction of the vari-
ance of the average portfolio return per se, but to the role as commitment device to
strengthen banks’ monitoring incentives. Further, greater diversification is valuable
because banks have limited lending capacities. In the model, lending is restricted by
the presence of capital requirements, but other stories which limit banks’ diversifica-
tion opportunities are in line with our theory. For example, restrictions (regulatory as
well as economic) to banks’ geographical scope and sector specialization may impose
such limits and justify multiple-bank lending.
These features of the analysis −leverage and limited lending abilities− capture
two important and typical aspects of the banking industry. Still, while we develop
our model in the context of a bank’s choice between lending to firms individually
and sharing lending with other banks in what one could describe as an “informal
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syndicate”, we believe that it can be adapted to the study of “formal” syndicates in
both banking and venture capital. Empirical findings suggest that, as in our model,
loan syndicates originate from banks’ desire to overcome capital requirements, lending
limits and the inability of granting loans in other sectors or regions (Simons, 1993;
Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000); but that they may lead to free-riding in monitoring
(Esty and Megginson, 2003). Similar factors seem to explain the formation of venture
capital syndicates, which are documented to improve the overall “value enhancing
activities” such as monitoring (Brander et al., 2002).
This paper is linked to a number of others. First, it relates to the literature
on banks’ incentives to monitor. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) rely on the non-
contractibility of monitoring to explain the coexistence of banks and capital markets
in a context where only one bank operates and monitors. Carletti (2004) analyzes
how banks’ incentives to monitor change with the number of bank relationships and
how this affects firms’ optimal borrowing choice. Similarly, Winton (1993) analyzes
the monitoring incentives of multiple shareholders. None of these papers, however,
look at the effects of diversification on both banks’ monitoring incentives and advan-
tages from sharing lending. In this respect, our paper is linked to Diamond (1984)
and Cerasi and Daltung (2000). However, whereas they focus on how diversification
influences monitoring incentives in a single-bank context, we use the incentive effect
of diversification to analyze the optimality of multiple-bank lending.2
The paper shares some insights also with the literature on financial structure as a
commitment to monitor. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chiesa (2001) and Al-
mazan (2002) we focus on the importance of inside equity and capital requirements,
but we enrich the framework by introducing multiple monitors and diversification
opportunities. Thakor (1996) analyzes the optimal number of banks that firms ap-
proach for credit in a model where banks perform screening and are subject to capital
requirements. Firms always approach multiple banks, as this reduces the probability
of being rationed. By contrast, we analyze banks’ choice between individual-bank
and multiple-bank lending in a context where banks perform postlending monitoring
and entering into multiple-bank relationships is not always optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic
2A contrasting view is in Winton (1999), where diversification may worsen banks’ incentives to
monitor and increase their chance of failure when loans are sufficiently exposed to sector downturns.
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model. Section 2 analyzes banks’ choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank
lending. Section 3 discusses the importance of bank leverage, and Section 4 the
robustness of the basic model. Section 5 contains the empirical implications. Section
6 concludes.
1 The basic model
Consider a two-date economy (T = 0, 1) with three classes of risk neutral agents:
numerous firms, banks and investors. Firms have access to an investment project
each, and need external funds to finance them. Only bank lending is available, and
banks can decide either to finance firms on their own −individual-bank lending− or
to share lending with other banks −multiple-bank lending.
Projects are risky and their returns are i.i.d. across firms. Each project i requires 1
unit of indivisible investment at date 0, and yields a return Xi = {0, R} at date 1.
The success probability of each project i, pi = Pr{Xi = R}, depends on the behavior
of its entrepreneur. It is pH if he behaves well, and pL if he misbehaves, with pH > pL.
Misbehavior renders entrepreneurs a non-transferable private benefit B, which can
be thought of as a quiet life, managerial perks, and diversion of corporate revenues
for private use. There is a moral hazard problem because entrepreneurs’ behavioral
choices are not observable.
Banks have E units of capital each and raise D units of deposits (henceforth, also
debt) from dispersed investors. Firms receive financing only if banks expect non-
negative profits, i.e., if they expect a return at least equal to the gross proceeds y ≥ 1
from an alternative investment. To provide a role for bank monitoring, we assume
that simple lending is not feasible, i.e.,
pH R > y > pLR+B, (A1)
and
∆p(R− y
pH
) < B, (A2)
where ∆p = pH − pL. Assumption (A1) means that projects are creditworthy only
if firms behave well. Assumption (A2) implies that private benefits are sufficiently
high to induce firms to misbehave even when loan rates are set at the lowest level
7
y
pH
which makes banks break even. Thus, simple lending is not feasible; and, because
firms cannot be given monetary incentives to behave well, we assume for simplicity
that banks extract the full project returns R.
Suppose now that banks can ameliorate firms’ moral hazard problem through moni-
toring. Each bank j chooses to monitor project i with an intensity mij ∈ [0, 1], which
determines the probability with which it observes firm i’s behavior and improves it in
the case of misbehavior. Monitoring is costly; an intensity mij costs C(mij) = c2m
2
ij.
The convex cost function reflects the greater difficulty for a bank to find out more
and more about a firm; and it means diseconomies of scale in monitoring. The size
of the monitoring costs is determined by the parameter c (henceforth, also referred
to as cost of monitoring).
Banks’ monitoring intensities are not observable either to investors or to other
banks. This introduces another moral hazard problem in the model, and it implies
that banks can raise deposits only if they can credibly promise investors an expected
return at least equal to the proceeds y from the alternative investment.
To create a role for multiple-bank lending, we assume that banks have restricted
lending capacities.3 One way to think about it is to consider that banks are subject
to a capital constraint ratio 1β (with β > 1), which limits their amounts of lending to
βE. As a consequence, banks raise an amount of deposits equal to
D = (β − 1)E, (A3)
and may not be able to perfectly diversify by themselves.4
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0 banks choose
between individual-bank lending and multiple-bank lending; their choice is observable
to both investors and other banks. Then, each bank offers investors a deposit contract
specifying the per-unit deposit rate. If investors accept the contract, each bank j
chooses the intensity mij with which to monitor project i. At date 1 project returns
3The assumption of limited diversification opportunities creates a potential role for multiple-
bank lending. If it was not satisfied, banks could perfectly diversify by themselves and multiple-
bank lending would never be optimal. See also the discussion about alternative diversification
opportunities in Section 4.
4Banks do not have incentives to raise an amount of deposits greater than (β−1)E since investing
in the alternative safe investment gives them zero profits.
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are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model if
investors accept the deposit contracts.
Insert Figure 1
2 Banks’ equilibrium choices
The model is solved as follows. We first take banks’ choice between individual-bank
and multiple-bank lending as given, and we characterize the equilibrium of each sce-
nario. Second, we analyze banks’ optimal lending choice.
2.1 Individual-bank lending
We start by characterizing the equilibrium of the game with individual-bank lending
(henceforth IL). Each bank finances D + E projects and sets the deposit rate at the
lowest level at which investors are willing to deposit their funds. Then, each bank
chooses the monitoring intensity with which to monitor each project. For simplicity,
since banks act independently of each other and we look for symmetric equilibria
where they all behave identically, we focus on a single representative bank.
Let r be the deposit rate and mi be the bank’s monitoring intensity. The success
probability of each project i is equal to
pi = pi(mi) = pH − (1−mi)∆p.
The deposit contract carries a bankruptcy risk, since the bank may not be able to
repay investors the promised deposit rate. The size of such a risk depends crucially on
the monitoring intensities m1...mD+E. The higher mi, the higher the project success
probability, and the more the bank can honor its repayment obligations. In case of
default, depositors split the realized return of the bank portfolio. We can express
the difference between the deposit rate r and the effective repayment that investors
receive in terms of expected shortfalls as follows.
Definition 1 Let the expected shortfalls of the individual-bank lending game be
S = S(m, r) =
Z D
D+E r
−∞
(r − D +E
D
z)h(z)dz,
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where m = m1...mD+E is the D+E-dimensional vector of the monitoring intensities
exerted by the bank on each of the D + E projects, z = 1D+E
D+EP
i=1
Xi is the average
sample return of a portfolio of D + E projects distributed according to the Normal
density function h(z) with mean RD+E
D+EP
i=1
pi and variance ( RD+E )
2
D+EP
i=1
pi(1− pi) and
Xi = {0, R}.5
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is then equal to
r − S; (1)
and the bank’s expected profit is given by
π(m, r) =
D+EX
i=1
piR− yE − [r − S]D −
c
2
D+EX
i=1
m2i , (2)
where the first term is the expected return from the D+E projects the bank finances,
the second term is the opportunity cost of the bank’s capital, the third term is de-
positors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring D +E
projects.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium of the individual-bank lending game.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the individual-bank game, in
which each bank monitors each project with intensity mi = mIL and offers the deposit
rate rIL, is characterized by the solution to the following equations:
∆pR+
∂SIL
∂mIL
D − cmIL = 0, (3)
rIL − SIL = y, (4)
where SIL = S(mIL, rIL).
Proof. See Appendix.
The monitoring intensity mIL and the equilibrium deposit rate rIL depend −both
directly and indirectly through the expected shortfalls− on the amounts of deposits
D and inside equity E, the project return R, and the cost of monitoring c.
5The Binomial distribution of the variable z is well approximated with a Normal distribution
when (D +E)p(1− p) > 10 (see, e.g., Ross, 1976).
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As already mentioned, raising deposits implies the well-known moral hazard prob-
lem of external financing. Since monitoring is not observable and the deposit rate is
set before monitoring is decided, raising deposits makes the bank lower monitoring
to reduce costs and avoid sharing the benefit with the investors. This mechanism is
captured by the second term in (3), which is negative as lower monitoring increases
the expected shortfalls. The moral hazard problem impacts the equilibrium deposit
rate (4), which, in turn, worsens the problem.
The severity of the moral hazard problem depends on the amount of inside equity
E, the cost of monitoring c, and the project return R. For a given level of debt,
a high E reduces the moral hazard problem and improves monitoring through the
effect on the expected shortfalls. As it allows the bank to finance more projects
and reach a greater degree of diversification, a high E reduces the variance of the
distribution of the average sample return z. This increases the benefit of monitoring
accruing to the bank, and it reduces the expected shortfalls. A low c (or a high
R) improves the bank’s incentive to monitor and decreases the expected shortfalls.
Thus, the equilibrium monitoring intensity with individual-bank lending mIL grows
with the amount of inside equity and the project return, whereas it falls with the cost
of monitoring. The opposite happens for the equilibrium deposit rate.
2.2 Multiple-bank lending
We now turn to the equilibrium of the game with multiple-bank lending (henceforth
ML). As before, the equilibrium requires that each bank j sets the deposit rate rj to
satisfy investors’ individual rationality constraint, and that each bank j chooses the
monitoring intensity mij for each project i so as to maximize its expected profit.
The difference with the individual-bank lending game depends on how banks share
project financing and interact in their monitoring decisions. We assume that each
bank shares financing with other k−1 banks so that it invests 1/k unit in each of the
k(D + E) projects in return for Rk in case of project success.
6 All banks choose how
much to monitor each project simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The individual
monitoring intensities, however, are interrelated in the impact on the firm’s behavior.
It is enough that one bank discovers misbehavior to induce good entrepreneurial
6For simplicity, we assume that all loans are initiated simultaneously. The model can however
be interpreted more broadly and be adapted to a context where loans are initiated sequentially.
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behavior and increase the success probability of the whole project. The idea is that
monitoring delivers a public good, and all banks financing a firm benefits from the
higher success probability of the project.
The success probability of project i with multiple-bank lending is then equal to
pki = p(Mi(mi1...mik), k) = pH −
Yk
j=1
(1−mij)∆p = pH − (1−Mi)∆p, (5)
whereMi = 1−
Qk
j=1(1−mij) is the total monitoring intensity that the k banks exert
in project i.
Similarly to before, we can define the expected shortfalls on the deposit contract
as follows.
Definition 2 Let the expected shortfalls of the multiple-bank lending game be
Sk = S(M, r) =
Z D
k(D+E) rj
−∞
(rj −
k(D +E)
D
v)g(v)dv, (6)
where M = [M1...Mk(D+E)] is the k(D + E)−dimensional vector of the total mon-
itoring intensities that all k banks exert on each of the k(D + E) projects, v =
1
k(D+E)
k(D+E)P
i=1
Xi is the average sample return of a portfolio of k(D+E) projects dis-
tributed according to the Normal density function g(v) with mean 1k(D+E)
R
k
k(D+E)P
i=1
pki
and variance
³
1
k(D+E)
´2 ³R
k
´2 k(D+E)P
i=1
pki (1− pki ), and Xi = {0, R}.
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is equal to
rj − Sk; (7)
and bank j’s expected profit is given by
πkj (M, r) =
k(D+E)X
i=1
pki
R
k
− yE −
h
rj − Sk
i
D − c
2
k(D+E)X
i=1
m2ij, (8)
where the first term represents the expected return from the k(D+E) projects bank
j finances, the second term is the opportunity cost of capital, the third term is depos-
itors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring k(D + E)
projects.
Expressions (5) and (8) show the features of the multiple-bank lending game.
First, for given lending capacity, banks can finance more projects and reach a greater
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degree of diversification than with individual-bank lending. Each bank can finance
k(D +E) projects instead of D +E. Second, the success probability of each project
depends on the monitoring of all k banks. This creates a free-riding problem: because
monitoring is privately costly and not observable, each bank has an incentive to
reduce its own effort and benefits from the other banks’ monitoring. Third, there
is a duplication of efforts because banks do not coordinate in the choice of their
monitoring intensities.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the multiple-bank lending game.
Proposition 2 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the multiple-bank lending game,
in which each bank monitors each project with intensity mij = mML and offers the
deposit rate rj = rML is characterized by the solution to the following equations:
∆pR
k
(1−mML)k−1 + ∂S
ML
∂mML
D − cmML = 0, (9)
rML − SML = y, (10)
where SML = S(MML, rML).
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparing equations (9) and (10) with (3) and (4) shows how the equilibrium in the
multiple-bank game differs from the one in the individual-bank game. Free-riding and
duplication of efforts tend to curtail banks’ incentives (term 1k(1 − mML)k−1), thus
increasing the expected shortfalls and pushing towards higher deposit rates. Greater
diversification pushes, however, in the opposite direction. The equilibrium monitoring
intensity mML and the equilibrium deposit rate rIL balance these contrasting effects.
Importantly, because of the greater number of banks monitoring the same project,
multiple-bank lending may imply higher per-project total monitoring than individual-
bank lending even if the individual monitoring intensity is lower, i.e., even if mML <
mIL. As we will show in the next subsection, whether this happens depends crucially
on the marginal effect of diversification, which is in turn determined by the amount
of inside equity E, the cost of monitoring c, and the project return R.
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2.3 The choice between individual-bank lending and multiple-
bank lending
We analyze now banks’ choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank lending.
Once we substitute assumption (A3) and the respective equilibrium monitoring in-
tensities and deposit rates in expressions (2) and (8), we can express banks’ expected
profits as:
πIL = βE
½
pILR− y − c
2
(mIL)2
¾
, (11)
πML = βE{pMLR− y − k c
2
(mML)2} (12)
if banks lend individually or share lending, respectively. The terms in parenthesis
represent, in order, the expected return of each project, the return from the alter-
native investment −which is equal from (4) and (10) to the expected repayments to
depositors −, and total monitoring costs.
Banks choose the lending structure that maximizes their expected profits. Their
choice depends on the relative differences between per-project success probabilities
−and, therefore, per-project total monitoring intensities− and each bank’s total mon-
itoring costs in (11) and (12).
Given the difficult analytical expressions for the equilibrium monitoring intensi-
ties and the expected shortfalls, we characterize banks’ optimal choice with numer-
ical simulations. We first compare monitoring intensities and monitoring costs with
individual-bank and multiple-bank lending; then we look at banks’ profits in the two
games. In all simulations we fix pH = 0.8, pL = 0.6, y = 1 and β = 12, whereas we
allow E, c, and R to vary as specified below. Choosing β = 12 corresponds to capital
requirements equal to 8%.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how individual and per-project total monitoring inten-
sities and total monitoring costs change as a function of the number of banks k when
the amount of inside equity varies from E = 0.5 to E = 1.5, the project return is
R = 1.52, and the cost of monitoring is c = 0.35.7
Insert Figures 2 and 3
7It is possible to analyze monitoring intensities and total monitoring costs (as well as banks’
expected profits below) simply as function of k because for k = 1 expressions (9) and (12) coincide
with (3) and (11), respectively. That is, k = 1 can be seen as a special case of multiple-bank lending.
14
Figure 2 shows that, whereas the individual monitoring intensity always decreases
with the number of banks k, the per-project total monitoring intensity increases with
k for k ≥ 2 if E = 0.5, whereas it decreases if E = 1.5. The intuition is as follows.
Banks with little inside equity cannot diversify much when lending individually. All
else equal, they are subject to a more severe moral hazard problem and exert a low
level of monitoring. Sharing lending allows banks to finance more projects. This
reduces their moral hazard problem and tends to increase monitoring. The marginal
impact of greater diversification on banks’ monitoring incentive is important enough
to dominate the drawbacks of free-riding and duplication of efforts and lead to higher
per-project total monitoring for k ≥ 2. On the contrary, banks with a large amount
of inside equity can reach a great enough level of diversification also when lending
individually. Thus, they face a weak moral hazard problem and exert a high monitor-
ing intensity. Sharing lending decreases both individual and per-project monitoring
intensities as free-riding and duplication of efforts dominate.
As illustrated in Figure 3, total monitoring costs always decrease with k. The
reduction is more pronounced if the amount of inside equity is high because in this
case the individual monitoring intensity decreases rapidly with k.
Similar mechanisms link monitoring intensities and total monitoring costs to
project return and cost of monitoring. One can show that, even when the amount of
inside equity is low, the per-project total monitoring intensity decreases with k if c
is low or R is high; and total monitoring costs still decrease with k in all cases. A
low c (a high R) implies that banks have a weak moral hazard problem and exert a
high level of monitoring also when lending individually (this can be easily seen from
equation (3)). Sharing lending reduces monitoring intensities and costs because diver-
sification has a small impact on banks’ monitoring incentives. The contrary happens
when c is high or R is low.8
To summarize all of this discussion:
Lemma 1 The per-project total monitoring intensity increases eventually with the
number of banks k if the amount of inside equity and the project return are low, and
8A positive relationship between monitoring cost and total monitoring intensity is also found by
Winton (1993) in the context of shareholders’ monitoring. Note, however, that, whereas the result
in Winton is due entirely to the convexity of the monitoring cost function, here it depends on the
marginal effect of the greater diversification achievable with multiple-bank lending. See also the
discussion in Section 3.
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the cost of monitoring is high. The individual monitoring intensity always decreases
with k.
Lemma 2 Total monitoring costs decrease with the number of banks k. Such a re-
duction is more pronounced if the amount of inside equity and the project return are
high, and the cost of monitoring is low.
We now turn to banks’ expected profits. In Figure 4 we fix R = 1.52 and c = 0.35,
and depict how banks’ expected profits change as a function of the number of banks
k when the amount of inside equity increases from E = 0.5 to E = 1.5. Then we
fix E = 0.5 and analyze in Figures 5 and 6 how banks’ expected profits change as a
function of k when, respectively, the cost of monitoring decreases from c = 0.35 to
c = 0.25 and the project return grows from R = 1.52 to R = 1.62.
Insert Figures 4, 5 and 6
Figure 4 shows that banks’ expected profits are higher with multiple-bank lending
than with individual-bank lending if E = 0.5, whereas the opposite happens if E =
1.5. Figures 5 and 6 show that multiple-bank lending is more profitable if c = 0.35
and R = 1.52, whereas individual-bank lending is more profitable otherwise. The
intuition behind these results hinges on Lemmas 1 and 2. If E is low, increasing
k implies higher per-project total monitoring intensity and thus higher per-project
success probability in (12) than in (11). Together with lower total monitoring costs,
this makes multiple-bank lending optimal. This result is not due to the diseconomies
of scale in monitoring but on the effect of greater diversification on banks’ monitoring
incentives. In fact, as Lemma 2 states, the reduction in total monitoring costs as k
increases is more pronounced when individual-bank lending is optimal.
Similarly, the positive relationship between per-project total monitoring and num-
ber of banks k explains the optimality of multiple-lending when the cost of monitoring
is high and project return is low. To sum up:
Proposition 3 Banks prefer multiple-bank lending if the amount of inside equity and
firms’ profitability are low, and the cost of monitoring is high; they prefer individual-
bank lending otherwise.
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3 The importance of bank leverage
The essential idea behind multiple-bank lending is that banks cannot perfectly diver-
sify when acting as single lenders. Greater diversification decreases the variance of the
distribution of the average portfolio return and improves banks’ incentives to moni-
tor. Higher monitoring reduces the expected shortfalls and the deposit rate promised
to depositors. This in turn improves banks’ incentives further as it allows them to
appropriate a larger fraction of the monitoring benefits. This incentive mechanism
works if and only if banks raise deposits, i.e., if they are leveraged. If banks are
non-leveraged, diversification does not affect their monitoring incentives through the
expected shortfalls and multiple-bank lending is no longer optimal despite implying
lower total monitoring costs.
To show the importance of bank leverage, we depict in Figure 7 how the expected
profits of leveraged and non-leveraged banks change as a function of the number of
banks k for the same parameter configuration as in Figure 4 for which leveraged banks
choose multiple-bank lending, i.e., E = 0.5, c = 0.35, and R = 1.52.
Insert Figure 7
Figure 7 shows that the expected profits of non-leveraged banks decrease with k,
whereas those of leveraged banks increase. As mentioned above, the reason is that
multiple-bank lending always lead to lower per-project total monitoring when banks
are non-leveraged. This is shown in Figure 8, where the behavior of the per-project
total monitoring intensities of leveraged and non-leveraged banks is depicted as a
function of the number of banks k sharing lending.
Insert Figure 8
Figures 8 and 9 together imply that multiple-bank lending is no more optimal when
banks are non-leveraged because the “negative” reduction in the per-project mon-
itoring intensity dominates the “positive” decrease in total monitoring costs. The
following proposition generalizes this result; and it strengthens Proposition 3 in that
it suggests once again that the optimality of multiple-bank lending is not driven by
the form of the monitoring cost function.
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Proposition 4 Non-leveraged banks do not have incentives to enter into multiple-
bank lending relationships if ∆pRc is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
So far we have derived our results under the (somewhat implicit) assumption that
when banks are leveraged, they raise the maximum amount of deposits they can
lend, i.e., D = (β − 1)E. After the discussion above, however, one may wonder
whether banks would not prefer to raise a lower amount of deposits, if any at all.
Raising deposits allows banks to expand their portfolios, but it also worsens their
moral hazard problem. We show now that this is not the case. We start with the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 Banks have incentives to raise a positive amount of deposits.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 relies on the idea that financing investment projects is profitable and a
small amount of deposits does not originate a severe moral hazard problem. But do
banks want to raise the maximum amount of deposits that they can invest given the
capital requirements? To see this, we use once again numerical simulations. Figure
9 depicts how banks’ expected profits change as a function of the number of banks
k when the amount of deposits increases from a case where capital requirements are
not binding (D = 4.5) to one where they are (D = 5.5). All of the other parameters
are as in Figure 4 when multiple-bank lending is optimal, i.e., E = 0.5, R = 1.52,
and c = 0.35.
Insert Figure 9
Figure 9 shows that banks find it optimal to raise an amount of deposits equal to
D = (β − 1)E = 5.5; their expected profits are increasing in D in the optimal region
of multiple-bank lending. The effect of greater diversification dominates, and banks
find it optimal to raise the maximum amount of deposits they can invest and diversify
as much as possible. One can show that banks want to do this also when individual-
bank lending is optimal, since their expected profits are still increasing in D in that
case.
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4 Discussion of the basic model
In this section we analyze various aspects of the basic model. In particular, we discuss
the role of capital requirements, other limitations to banks’ lending capacities and
diversification opportunities, alternative monitoring technologies and cost functions.
Limits to diversification
Banks’ incentives to enter into multiple—bank relationships originate from the need of
increasing portfolio diversification and reaching higher per-project monitoring. The
main underlying assumption is that banks have limited lending capacities, and they
may not be able to diversify enough when lending to firms individually. In the model
lending capacities are restricted by capital requirements. This idea is in line with the
literature on delegated monitoring and capital-constrained lending (e.g., Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997; Thakor, 1996; Chiesa, 2001; Almazan, 2002).
The concept of capital requirements we have in mind is quite broad. The para-
meter β of our model encompasses any capital constraint which may limit lending,
such as regulatory, effective or also market capital requirements.9 More generally, any
story which limits lending diversification possibilities is in line with our theory. Ex-
amples are restrictions on banks’ geographical scope and sector specialization. Even
though regulatory restrictions to geographical expansion have been mostly abolished
in the last decades, many factors limiting banks’ ease to lend in distant regions are
still in place. There is evidence that monitoring firms located at distant locations
involves higher costs due to information problems, transportation costs, and, espe-
cially if located in foreign regions, differences in legal systems, supervisory regimes,
corporate governance, language, and cultural conditions (Acharya et al., 2004; and
the survey in Degryse and Ongena, 2003). The need of expertise may increase mon-
itoring costs (Almazan, 2002) and worsen the effectiveness of monitoring (Winton,
1999), thus limiting banks’ lending capacities across sectors. As in our model, in
such cases banks may prefer to enter into multiple-bank relationships and increase
diversification with a lower fraction of more costly loans.
9“Effective” capital requirements may include a buffer above the regulatory minimum to cush-
ion banks against unexpected negative shocks and protect them against falling below regulatory
minimum ( Berger, 1995); “market” capital requirements refer to the amount of capital the market
requires banks to possess as price against default risk (Flannery and Rangan, 2002).
19
The choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank lending resembles also the
trade-off between specialization and diversification across sectors in terms of corre-
lation among projects (e.g., Hellwig, 1998; Winton, 1999). If specializing implies
lower monitoring costs but higher correlations among projects, the choice between
individual-bank and multiple-bank lending can be seen as a trade-off between risk
and costs. Banks may choose to share lending to achieve greater diversification with
lower costs.
Alternative diversification opportunities
So far we have assumed that, for a given level of inside equity, banks can expand
their portfolios only by entering into multiple-bank relationships. Of course, there
are other ways in which banks could relax capital requirements and increase lending
capacities. The most immediate way is raising outside equity. This solution can be,
however, quite costly. First, raising outside equity may not improve banks’ monitoring
incentives, since, differently from raising debt, it does not reduce their incentives to
exploit external financiers when diversification increases (Cerasi and Daltung, 2000).
Second, in a context where banks act as liquidity providers, raising outside equity
worsens such a valuable function (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Finally, as is well
known from the corporate finance literature, raising outside equity implies some costs
in terms of foregone tax advantages, asymmetric information, and transaction costs
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; and the empirical evidence
in Smith, 1986). Thus, allowing banks to raise outside equity may not change their
choice of sharing lending. Whenever individual-bank lending is not optimal, banks
would weigh the costs of multiple-bank lending against the costs of raising outside
equity, and would still choose to share lending if this implies higher profits.
Another alternative way for banks to increase lending is to merge. Mergers lead
to higher inside equity and, if occurring across different geographical areas or sec-
tors, allow banks to invest in more distant and more independent projects. This
expands lending and improves diversification. However, mergers also involve some
costs. By creating larger organizations, they may lead to more severe agency prob-
lems, organizational diseconomies and distortions linked to the implicit too-big-to fail
guarantee.10
10See Carletti et al. (2002) for a discussion of the effects of bank mergers on diversification
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Finally, also information sharing may affect banks’ incentives to enter into multiple-
bank relationships. Regardless of whether this is provided through public credit
registers or private bureaus, sharing information about borrowers’ performances can
substitute −at least to some extent− for private monitoring, thus reducing banks’
monitoring costs.11 This increases the attractiveness of individual-bank lending, but it
does not allow banks to increase diversification. Thus, banks may still prefer multiple-
bank lending when the incentive effect of diversification dominates.
Alternative monitoring technologies
The monitoring technology we have assumed so far gives banks a direct form of
control on firms’ behavior. Monitoring allows banks to observe firms’ project choices
and intervene in case of misbehavior. Other forms of control are, however, plausible.
For example, through monitoring banks could observe firms’ behavior and liquidate
them for a total value of C (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000). Whether
this leads to different results for the optimality of multiple-bank lending depends on
how the liquidation value C is allocated among banks. The results of the basic model
still hold if banks share C equally in case of default independently of whether they
monitor. Results may differ, however, if a monitoring bank is the first to seize C. This
reduces free-riding, but it may reduce the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending if
it leads to excessive duplication of efforts.
Monitoring cost function
So far we have assumed that monitoring costs are convex. As shown in Proposition
4, however, what is crucial for our theory is the fact that banks are leveraged rather
than the exact form of the monitoring cost function. Therefore, although convex costs
overestimate the optimality of multiple-bank lending because they imply diseconomies
of scale in monitoring, our qualitative results are robust to various modifications of
the cost function. Assuming linear costs, overload costs, or some initial fixed costs
opportunities and risk taking; Degryse and Ongena (2003) for a more specific discussion of the
effects of cross-border mergers; and Cerasi and Daltung (2002) for an analysis of organizational
diseconomies.
11See Jappelli and Pagano (2002) for a description of the different types of information sharing
agreements across countries.
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would reduce the range of parameters for which multiple-bank lending is optimal, but
it would not modify our qualitative insights.
5 Empirical implications
The main insight of the paper is to show that multiple-bank lending can be beneficial
as it allows banks to increase the overall effort with which they monitor firms. This
result implies that sharing lending improves firms’ future profitability, consistent with
the evidence in Houston and James (1996) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). Further,
it has a number of empirical implications for the determinants of multiple-bank lend-
ing, which differentiate our theory from the hold-up and the soft-budget-constraint
literatures. Although the unobservability of monitoring makes it difficult to devise a
direct test of our model, some of its predictions are consistent with recent empirical
findings.
The amount of inside equity is correlated with the relative size of banks and
firms. Thus, the model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks
are small relative to the projects they finance, since in this case they cannot diversify
much when lending individually. Consistent with this, Ongena and Smith (2000b)
find little use of multiple-bank lending in more concentrated banking systems, and
Petersen and Rajan (1995) document a negative (though not very strong) relationship
between the number of bank relationships and market concentration for young small
firms.
Since the value of monitoring is higher when investment projects are less profitable,
there is a negative relationships between multiple-bank lending and firms’ ex ante
profitability. This is supported by Detragiache et al. (2000), Petersen and Rajan
(1994) and Farinha and Santos (2002); and it suggests also that monetary policy may
affect banks’ lending choices. Even if so far we have considered firms’ profitability
in terms of return from the risky projects, one can show that similar (but inverse)
results hold for the return of the alternative safe investment. An increase in the
riskless interest rate makes multiple-bank lending relatively more attractive, as it
reduces firms’ profitability. Thus, by raising riskless interest rates, a tight monetary
policy induces banks to enter into multiple-bank relationships. If then monetary
policy is counter-cyclical, periods of expansionary economic activity induce banks to
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enter into multiple-bank relationships.12
The cost of monitoring refers to the ease with which banks can acquire informa-
tion about firms; and it is linked to disclosure and accounting standards, and the
efficiency of the judicial system. Also, to the extent that they affect banks’ infor-
mation acquisition in different sectors or geographical areas, the size of the cost of
monitoring is negatively related to the degree of financial integration and positively
with the level of regulatory restrictions. Thus, banks should share lending in countries
with laxer accounting and disclosure standards, more inefficient judicial systems, less
integrated and more regulated markets. Some of these predictions are supported by
the findings in Detragiache et al.(2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000b) of greater
use of multiple-bank lending in countries with more inefficient judicial systems and
poorer enforcement of creditor rights. Also, the evidence in Berger et al. (2003)
that firms frequently use local host nation banks is consistent with our prediction of
greater use of multiple-bank relationships when geographical distance increases the
cost of monitoring and makes individual diversification more difficult.
Finally, the model has some indirect predictions concerning diversification oppor-
tunities rather than multiple-bank lending. In particular, it suggests a lower use of
multiple-bank lending when equity markets are well developed and after a process
of mergers of acquisitions. Consistent with this, Ongena and Smith (2000b) report
a little use of multiple-bank lending in the presence of strong equity markets; and
Karceski et al. (2004) and Degryse et al. (2004) find that, following consolidation,
banks are more likely to terminate lending relationships with firms borrowing from
multiple banks.
Some of the predictions mentioned above contrast with those of the hold-up and
soft-budget constraint literature. For instance, the hold-up literature (Rajan, 1992;
Von Thadden, 1992 and 2004) implies that, in order to improve entrepreneurs’ incen-
tives, banks should enter into multiple-bank relationships when they are more likely
to expropriate informational rents. Thus, to the extent that the level of concentration
of the banking system is a proxy of banks’ informational market power (Petersen and
12Several papers have discussed the negative effect of a tighter monetary policy on banks’ moni-
toring incentives and lending (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Repullo and Suarez, 2000; Chiesa,
2001; and Almazan, 2002). Our model suggests that banks could avoid lowering credit by entering
into multiple-bank relationships. In this respect, our paper is in line with Thakor (1996), who shows
that a tight monetary policy does not necessarily lower lending.
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Rajan, 1995), the hold-up literature predicts −in contrast with our theory and with
the evidence in Ongena and Smith (2000b)− greater use of multiple-bank lending
in more concentrated banking systems, such as it may emerge, e.g., after a wave of
mergers and acquisitions.
Yet, a clear-cut distinction of the theories is not always possible. For instance,
concerning the effect of multiple-bank lending, both our theory and the soft-budget-
constraint literature (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995, in particular) suggest that shar-
ing lending improves firms’ future profitability, but for different reasons. The in-
creased firms’ profitability originates from the higher overall level of bank monitoring
in our theory, and from the improved entrepreneurial incentives in the soft-budget-
constraint literature.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes banks’ incentives to enter into multiple-bank relationships with
other banks in a context where both firms and banks are subject to moral hazard, and
monitoring is essential. Banks choose multiple-bank lending whenever the benefit of
greater diversification in terms of higher overall monitoring dominates the drawbacks
of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The incentive mechanism of diversification
works only if banks raise deposits, since otherwise diversification does not affect mon-
itoring incentives. The attractiveness of multiple-bank lending decreases with the
amount of banks’ inside equity and firms’ prior profitability, whereas it increases with
the cost of monitoring.
The main insight of the paper, namely that multiple-bank lending can increase
overall monitoring, complements Diamond’s theory of banks as delegated monitors,
and it provides an alternative to the hold-up and the soft-budget-constraint theories
in explaining why banks may want to enter into multiple-bank relationships.
The two important features of the analysis−leverage and limited lending capacities−,
together with the emphasis put on the role of monitoring, capture the nature of banks
and make our analysis particularly suited for explaining the financing of small and
medium businesses. Still, our analysis can also be adapted also to other forms of
multiple creditors such as loan and venture capital syndicates. These syndicates can
be considered as a special form of multiple-bank lending in that a lead −or more than
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one− bank (venture capital) approaches a firm and decides to share the financing with
other banks (venture capitalists), which are then responsible for their stakes and the
monitoring of the firm.
We develop the analysis under the assumption that all banks share financing
equally when they enter into multiple-bank relationships. Allowing for asymmetric
shares of financing would lead to results somewhere between those obtained with
multiple banks with symmetric shares and banks lending individually, and it might
explain some other important features of banking systems such as the emergence
and the role of “housebanks”. Both this analysis and a deeper understanding of
the effects of syndicates on information production constitute interesting avenues for
future research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For a given r, the bank chooses mi to maximize (2). The first order condition gives
∂π
∂mi
= ∆pR+
∂S
∂mi
D − cmi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., D +E.
Solving for a symmetric equilibrium gives (3). Setting (1) equal to y after substituting
mIL gives (4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
For a given rj, each bank j chooses mij to maximize (8). The first order condition
gives
∂πkj
∂mij
=
∆pR
k
Y
s6=j
(1−mis)+
∂Sk
∂mij
D−cmij = 0, for = 1...k and i = 1, ..., k(D+E).
Substituting mij = mML in a symmetric equilibrium gives (9). Setting (7) equal to y
after substituting mML gives (10). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
For a given k, the expected profit of a non-leveraged bank (D = 0) is
π =
kEX
i=1
½
pki
R
k
− y
k
− c
2
m2ij
¾
. (13)
Each bank chooses mij to maximize (13). The first order condition gives
∆pR
k
Y
s6=j
(1−mis)− cmij = 0, for j = 1, ...., k and i = 1, ..., k(D +E).
The system has only one symmetric solution, which is given by
(1− mˆ)k−1∆pR− kcmˆ = 0. (14)
It follows that the equilibrium monitoring intensity mˆ is non-increasing in k. If k = 1,
the bank is lending individually. In this case mˆ = 1, if ∆pRc ≥ 1. For all k > 1, mˆ < 1.
Substituting mˆ into (13) gives the equilibrium expected profit of each bank
πˆ = E
½
pˆR− y − k c
2
(mˆ)2
¾
. (15)
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Neglecting indivisibilities, the first order condition of (15) with respect to k is
− c
2
(mˆ)2 +
h
k(1− mˆ)k−1∆pR− kcmˆ
i ∂mˆ
∂k
− (1− mˆ)k∆pR ln(1− mˆ) ≤ 0. (16)
The first term is negative, the second term is non-positive, while the last one is non-
negative. The first term is the additional cost of monitoring more projects when
banks share lending. The second term represents the effect of the decrease in the
individual monitoring intensity of all banks as k increases. This effect is negative if
mˆ < 1, and it is zero otherwise. The last term is the increase in the project success
probability when an additional bank monitors the project. This effect is positive as
long as mˆ is less than one; when the project is already fully monitored there is no
benefit from having an additional monitor.
For k = 1 the Envelope Theorem applies to mˆ, and (16) reduces to
− c
2
(mˆ)2 − (1− mˆ)∆pR ln(1− mˆ) ≤ 0. (17)
The left hand side is negative if mˆ = 1. Hence, if the bank chooses to monitor with
intensity equal to one, it has no incentive to share lending. If ∆pRc < 1, (14) is
binding. Substituting it into (17) gives
−1
2
∆pR
c
− (1− ∆pR
c
) ln(1− ∆pR
c
) ≤ 0,
which is fulfilled for ∆pRc > 0.72. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
For a given amount of deposits D, banks’ equilibrium expected profits are given by
(D +E)
½ep R− y − k c
2
(fm)2¾ ,
where fm is the solution to
∆pR
k
(1−fm)k−1 + ∂S
∂m
D − cfm = 0,
and
er − S(fm, er) = y,
with ep = pH − (1−fm)k∆p. The derivative of the expected profits with respect to D
gives ½epR− y − c
2
(fm)2¾+ (D +E) hk(1−fm)k−1∆pR− kcfmi ∂fm
∂D
≥ 0. (18)
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For k = 1, (18) is strictly positive at D = 0, since the Envelope Theorem then holds
with respect to fm. For k > 1, the Envelope Theorem does not hold because a change
in D affects the monitoring intensities of all banks k in the same way. However, a
small increase in D has a small impact on fm so that, if project lending is profitable
enough, each bank has an incentive to raise deposits. Q.E.D.
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Fig. 1. Timing of the model.
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Fig. 2. Individual and per-project total monitoring intensities. The figure shows how the individual monitoring intensity m 
and the per-project total monitoring intensity M change as a function of the number of banks k when the inside equity E
increases from 0.5 to 1.5.
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Fig. 3. Total monitoring costs. The figure shows how  bank’s total monitoring costs TC change as a function of the number 
of banks k when the inside equity E increases from 0.5 to 1.5.
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Fig. 4. Banks’ expected profits and inside equity. The figure shows how banks’ expected profits π change as a function of 
the number of banks k when the inside equity E increases from 0.5 to 1.5.
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Fig. 5. Banks’ expected profits and cost of monitoring. The figure shows how banks’ expected profits π change as a 
function of the number of banks k when the cost of monitoring c decreases from 0.35 to 0.25.
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Fig. 6. Banks’ expected profits and project return. The figure shows how banks’ expected profits π change as a function of 
the number of banks k when the project return R increases from 1.52 to 1.62.
π (R=1.52)
Fig. 7. Expected profits of leveraged and non-leveraged banks. The figure shows how the expected profits π of leveraged 
and non-leveraged banks change as a function of the number of banks k. The figure is drawn for inside equity E=0.5, cost 
of monitoring c=0.35, and project return R=1.52. The amount of deposits of the leveraged banks is D=5.5.
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Fig. 8. Per-project total monitoring intensities of leveraged and non-leveraged banks. The figure shows how the per-project 
total monitoring intensities M of leveraged and non-leveraged banks change as a function of the number of banks k. The 
figure is drawn for the same parameter configurations as in Figure 7.
M (D=0)
M (D=5.5)
πk2 3 4 5 6-0.025
0.025
0.05
0.075
0.1
0.125
Fig. 9. Banks’ expected profits and amount of deposits. The figure shows how banks’ expected profits π change as a
function of the number of banks k when the amount of deposits D increases from 4.5 to 5.5. The figure is drawn for the
same parameter configuration as in Figure 7.
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